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THE INFLUENCE OF MARVIN i. MARVIN ON
HOUSEWORK DURING MARRIAGE
Margaret F. Brinig*
When Michelle Marvin was forced to leave the home she shared
with what today we would call her partner, Lee Marvin,' she had a
number of problems. The first ones, of course, were legal: she had no
marriage with Lee and no written contract that could distinguish their
relationship from "mere cohabitation."2 Nor had she contributed di-
rectly to his career or other assets.3 What she alleged was his express
promise to "take care of her"4 (for some time period that was not
altogether clear) and, less obviously, a promise implied by all she had
done with and for him during the seven years they had spent to-
gether5 and, still less obviously, career sacrifices she allegedly made in
order to further his career6 or to accommodate his express desire that
* Professor of Law, University of Iowa. BA Duke, 1970; J.D. Seton Hall, 1973;
Ph.D. George Mason, 1994. Special thanks to Gatsby Contreras, my research assistant
extraordinaire.
1 The relationship ended "at his insistence." Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr.
555, 557 (Ct. App. 1981).
2 Id. at 557-59 (discussing the various findings of the trial court and finding no
basis for its award of $104,000 in rehabilitative support).
3 Id. at 557.
4 Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976) ("Plaintiff avers that in Octo-
ber of 1964 she and defendant 'entered into an oral agreement' that while 'the par-
ties lived together they would combine their efforts and earnings and would share
equally any and all property accumulated as a result of their efforts whether individual
or combined.'").
5 The court held, "In the absence of an express contract, the courts should in-
quire into the conduct of the parties to determine whether that conduct demon-
strates an implied contract, agreement of partnership orjoint venture, or some other
tacit understanding between the parties." Id. The court also stated, "The courts may
inquire into the conduct of the parties to determine whether that conduct demon-
strates an implied contract or implied agreement of partnership or joint venture or
some other tacit understanding between the parties." Id. at 122 (citation omitted).
6 "[P]laintiff agreed to 'give up her lucrative career as an entertainer (and)
singer' in order to 'devote her full time to defendant... as a companion, home-
maker, housekeeper and cook;' in return defendant agreed to 'provide for all of
plaintiff's financial support and needs for the rest of her life.'" Id.
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she not work far away from him.,7 As it turned out, she had fact
problems as well and was ultimately unable to show either any sort of
promise (agreement) or any benefit lost or conferred.8
If the Marvins had been married for seven years instead of scorn-
ing tle "piece of paper" that was the marriage certificate, 9 the story
might well have turned out differently. Even if Lee had not promised
to "take care of" Michelle, he would in his vows have committed him-
self, regardless of his private wishes, to a duty of support for her.10
Since the couple lived in California, Michelle would automatically
have been entitled to a share of the property earned by his labors
during the marriage-"community property""I-whether or not she
could prove that he had gained from her contributions or that her
career had suffered because of her sacrifices.'
2
While the California courts would have let Michelle recover if she
had been able to show any sort of contractual or equitable claim to
relief 13-and this took them further than most courts would go, even
today14-we ought to be curious about whether this result, a result
7 Seeid
8 See Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 558.
9 CARL E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F. BRINIG, AN INVITATION TO FAMILY LAW: PRIN.
CIPLEs, PROCESS, AND PERSPECTrVES 501-15 (2d ed. 2000) (reprinting the opinion of
Judge Marshall of the trial court on remand in Marvin v. Marvin, Civ. 59130 (Super.
Ct. L.A. County 1979)).
10 See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 4334-4335 (West 1994) (providing for support of for-
mer spouses for contingent and fixed periods of time, respectively).
11 IdI § 2550.
12 CAt.. FAM. CODE § 2550 provides:
Except upon the written agreement of the parties, or on oral stipulation of
the parties in open court, or as otherwise provided in this division, in a pro-
ceeding for dissolution of marriage or for legal separation of the parties, the
court shall, either in its judgment of dissolution of the marriage, in its judg-
ment of legal separation of the parties, or at a later time if it expressly
reserves jurisdiction to make such a property division, divide the community
estate of the parties equally.
13 See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 118 (Cal. 1976) ("Plaintiff's complaint...
could be amended to state a cause of action founded upon theories of implied con-
tract or equitable relief. As we have noted, both causes of action in plaintiff's com-
plaint allege an express contract; neither assert any basis for relief independent from
the contract.").
14 As of February 2001, six states unequivocally recognized breach of implied con-
tracts for non-business contributions by cohabitants. In addition to California, these
states are Connecticut, see Boland v. Catalano, 521 A.2d 142, 146 (Conn. 1987); Indi-
ana, see Glasgo v. Glasgo, 410 N.E.2d 1325, 1331 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Michigan, see
Featherston v. Steinhoff, 575 N.W.2d 6, 9 (Mich. Ct. App, 1997) (including a pre-
sumption that services performed are gratuitous, however); Oregon, see Pinto v.
[VOL- 76-513912
HOUSEWORK DURING MARRIAGE
that did not occur in the Marvin case but has in countless others from
all over the United States15 (and some foreign countries' 6), would
have been ajust one. Further, while most of the papers in this Sympo-
sium are discussing the extent to which cohabitants, heterosexual or
same-sex, do and ought to recover twenty-five years later, I am reflect-
mng here on a closely related question: the impact of Marvin, and Afar-
vin-type thinking, on married couples.'7
The inquiry that follows will address several correlative questions.
What, besides a piece of paper, do married couples have that cohab-
iting couples do not? Why, from a factual as opposed to a moral point
of view, might this justify different treatment of their finances when
the couples break up? Why are the profound Marvin implications so
closely related to a feminist agenda not only for the family, but also
for the labor force? How can the value of "women's work" in the
home be compensated to remedy the "gender gap" in earnings, and
should it be? Is it fair, good, or wise to deal with these problems when
couples divorce but not in a more direct and pervasive way when
couples continue to live together? Finally, to the extent that Marvin
sounds in contract, is there something about marriage that makes
Smalz, 955 P.2d 770, 773 (Or. Ct. App. 1998); and Pennsylvania, see Knauer t,.
Knauer, 470 A.2d 553, 564 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983). Other states will do so when the
parties are engaged in a business relationship in addition to their personal one. Se,
ag, Champion v. Frazier, 977 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); Martin v. Coleman,
19 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tenn. 2000); In re Estate of Thorton, 499 P.2d 864, 866 (Wash.
1972).
15 For two surveys, see generally Sanford N. Katz, EmergingModdsforAternaties to
Marriage, 33 F m. L.Q. 663 (1999), and Katherine C. Gordon, Note, The Necessi y and
Enforcement of Cohabitation Agreements: Wien Strings Uill Attach and How to Prevent
Them-A State Survey, 37 BRDms LJ. 245 (1998-1999).
16 See, eg, Rebecca Bailey-Harris, FinancialRights in Relationships Outside Marriage:
A Decade of Reform in Australia, 9 lNr'LJ.L. & FAt. 233, 238-39 (1995); Craig A. Sloane,
Note, A Rose by Any Other Name: Marriage and the Danish Registered Partnership Act, 5
CARDOZOJ. INT'L & Comp. L. 189, 191 (1997).
17 I suspect, with no empirical data to support my notion, that the analysis here
will apply exactly to couples electing "civil union" under Vermont's new legislation.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (Supp. 2000). I also suspect that the distinction
between married and cohabiting couples that I will draw for heterosexual couples uill
hold true for same-sex partners who, at least in Vermont, do not take ad-antage of
such laws. See id I am less sanguine about the results for couples elsewhere who have
gone through "commitment ceremonies" and who consider themselves married, but
who cannot marry because state law forbids it. Were these heterosexual couples,
some states would permit at least the "innocent" party to recover under "putative
spouse" laws: they tried, they made the commitment, they conferred every benefit and
undertook every sacrifice they would have if married, but, through no fault of their
own, that "mere piece of paper" remained illusive. Se, eg., Marvin, 557 P.2d at 118;
Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1210 (Ill. 1979).
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thinking in terms of entitlements, as contract doctrine encourages us
to do, inappropriate or even destructive?
When Michelle Marvin's case was first appealed through the Cali-
fornia courts, she had a formidable ally in University of California-
Davis professor Carol Bruch, who wrote the amicus brief for the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court 8 that later turned into a pathbreaking article
in the Family Law Quarterly.'9 In her turn, Bruch had been heavily
influenced by the early work of sociologist Lenore Weitzman, whose
Legal Regulation of Marriage20 stressed the importance of housework,
largely done by women, for the earning capacity of the spouse who
was the primary breadwinner.2' Bruch extended Weitzman's thinking
beyond marriage and moved it from social sciences into law at pre-
cisely the time when most legislatures were rethinking property divi-
sion at divorce. For the last twenty-five years, academics of all sorts
have pondered the relationship between home and market work.22
18 Bruch's influence on Marvin shines through the following section of the
opinion:
As Justice Curtis points out 'Unless it can be argued that a woman's services
as cook, housekeeper, and homemaker are valueless, it would seem logical
that if, when she contributes money to the purchase of property, her interest
will be protected, then when she contributes her services in the home, her
interest in property accumulated should be protected.'
Marvin, 557 P.2d at 119 (citing Vallera v. Vallera, 134 P.2d 761, 764 (Cal. 1943) (Cur-
tis, J., dissenting); Carol S. Bruch, Property Rights of De Facto Spouses Including Thoughts
on the Value of Homemakers' Services, 10 FAmI. L.Q. 101, 102 (1976)). The case also states:
But although we reject the reasoning of Cary and Atherley, we share the per-
ception of the Cary and Atherley courts that the application of former prece-
dent in the factual setting of those cases would work an unfair distribution of
the property accumulated by the couple. Justice Friedman in Beckman v.
Mayhew... also questioned the continued viability of our decisions in Vallera
and Keene; commentators have argued the need to reconsider those prece-
dents. We should not, therefore, reject the authority of Cary and Atherley
without also examining the deficiencies in the former law which led to those
decisions.
Id. at 120-21 (citing Carol S. Bruch, Property Rights of De Facto Spouses Including
Thoughts on the Value of Homemakers' Services, 10 FAm. L.Q. 101, 102 (1976)).
19 Carol S. Bruch, Property Rights of De Facto Spouses Including Thoughts on the Value
of Homemakers' Services, 10 FAm. L.Q. 101, 102 (1976).
20 Lenore V. Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CAL.
L. RE;v. 1169 (1974).
21 Id. at 1281.
22 See, ag., LNDAJ. WArrE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY
MARIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF FiNANCIALLY 97-109
(2000); Gary S. Becker et al., An EconomicAnalysis of Marital Instability, 85J. POL. ECON.
1141, 1142-46 (1977); Suzanne M. Bianchi & Daphne Spain, Women, Work, and Family
in America, 51 POPULATION BuLL. 2, 31-35 (1996); Shelley Coverman & Joseph F.
(VOL. 76:51314
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While the discussion will no doubt continue and will be fueled by ex-
changes such as that of this Symposium, the American Law Institute's
(ALI) project on Family Dissolution,23 adopted in the spring of
2000,24 suggests several answers to these questions, as no doubt Profes-
sor Ellman, the project's Chief Reporter, will tell us. The first sugges-
tion of the ALI is that, in domestic partnerships that closely resemble
marriages,25 the results ought to be the same as for marriage.2 6 The
second is that both should be measured, failing a more accurate ac-
Sheley, Change in Alen's Housework and Child-Care Time, 1965-75, 48 J. Muu,%GE &
FAM. 413, 420 (1986); Mary E. O'Connell, On the Fringe: Rethinking the Link Between
Wages and Benefits, 67 TuL. L. REv. 1421, 1478-97 (1993); Amy L Wax, Bargaining in
the Shadow of the Market: Is There a Future for Egalitarian Marriage?, 84 V,. L REA% 509,
599-603 (1998). See generally Gary S. Becker, A Theory of the Allocation of Time, 75
ECON.J. 493 (1965) (providing an economic analysis of the relationship between work
and leisure time); Margaret F. Brinig, Equality and Sharing. lews of Household Across the
Iron Curtain, 7 Eui.J.L. & ECON. 55 (1998) (exploring the results of German legisla-
tion seeking to remedy the inequality of housework contributed by husband and
wife); Gillian KL Hadfield, Households at Work: Biyond Labor Market Policies to Remedy the
Gender Gap, 82 GEo. LJ. 89 (1993) (suggesting how the relationship between home
and market work contributes to the gender gap in compensation); Elisabeth M.
Landes, Economics of Alimony, 7J. LEAL STD. 35 (1978) (analyzing alimony aards
with respect to the distinction of home versus market work for the wife); Frances E.
Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 H,%%. L Rr%.
1497 (1983) (arguing that the market/family dichotomy must be overcome in order
for meaningful reform efforts aimed at improving the lives of women); Allen M. Park-
man, Why Are Married Women Working So Hard?, 18 INT'L RE%. L & EcoN. 41 (1998)
(concluding that no-fault divorce has increased the number of hours worked in the
market without a corresponding reduction of home work); Katharine Silbaugh, Turn-
ing Labor into Love; Housework and the Law, 91 Nw. U. L REV. 1 (1996) (discussing the
sociology, economics, and legal treatment of housework in comparison to market
work); Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEo. UJ. 1571 (1996) (discussing the
tax code's distinction between home and market work and how it reflects sexual
distinctions).
23 PRINcIEs OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DissoLUTrON: Anw.-sis %ND REco"u.LENDA.
TroNs (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2000) [hereinafter ALI PRINciPLES (Tentative Draft
2000)].
24 See Actions Taken at 2000 Annual MeAeting, at http://i%%v.ali-aba.org/ali/
ali200(Lactionssummary.htm (last modified Oct. 19, 2000).
Subject to the discussion at the meeting and to final editorial revisions, the
Institute completed its review of the project by giving final approval both to
Tentative Draft No. 4 and to earlier drafts that had been tentatively ap-
proved. The entire work will be integrated into a coherent final text, which
is expected to be published in 2001.
Id.
25 ALI Principles § 6.03(1) defines domestic partners as "two persons of the same
or opposite sex, not married to one another, who for a significant period of time
share a primary residence and a life together as a couple." ALI PRINcnpi.xs (Tentative
Draft 2000), supra note 23, § 6.03(1).
2001] 1315
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counting,27 by the extent of the career loss of the spouse (or partner)
making sacrifices for the relationship. 28 The third, a result approxi-
mated in community property states at least, is that the contributions
of each, in cash or kind, should be presumed equal if the spouses
(partners) stay together for some period of time.
29
I. How Do THE RELEVANT INCENTIVES IN MARRIAGE DIFFER FROM
THOSE IN COHABITATION?
At least some notable sociologists of the family agree that mar-
riage seems to benefit participants (and particularly men) in ways that
cohabitation does not.30 Marriage makes men and women live
longer.3 ' For men, the lifestyle and motivational changes that come
with marriage and having children also translate into more stable em-
ployment, higher earnings, and more responsibility on thejob.32 For
26 Thus, ALI Principles § 6.04(1) defines domestic-partnership property, subject to
distribution "if it would be marital property under Chapter 4, had the domestic part-
ners been married to one another during the domestic-partnership period." 1i.
§ 6.04(1). Section 6.06(1) (a) provides that unless stated otherwise "a domestic part-
ner is entitled to compensatory payments on the same basis as a spouse under Chap-
ter 5." Id. § 6.06(1)(a).
27 Some of the pragmatic problems for awarding emotional losses and gains are
discussed in PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYsis AND RECOMMEN.
DAnONS § 5.02 cmt. at 262-63 (Proposed Final Draft Part 1, 1997) [hereinafter ALI
PUNCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft 1997)]. Problems of allocating gain are discussed
id. at 263-64. The contribution rationale for dividing marital property is discussed
and rejected by the Reporter in the comments on § 5.05, see id. § 5.05 cmt. at 303-04.
28 See id § 5.02. The career loss, or opportunity cost, is that alternative that most
likely would have been taken by the sacrificing spouse had the couple found the
money somewhere else. See id&
29 ALI Principks § 4.15(1) provides: "Except as provided in Paragraph (2) of this
section, marital property and marital debts are divided at dissolution so that the
spouses receive net shares equal in value, although not necessarily identical in kind."
Id. § 4.15(1). For the rationale that supports this section, see id. § 4.15 cmt. (b) at
196-97.
30 See, e g., Steven L. Nock, Turn-Taking as Rational Behavior, 27 Soc. ScL. Rrs. 235,
243 (1999) ("Several decades of research have shown, for example, that men are the
greater beneficiaries of marriage than women.").
31 See WA=TE & GALLAGHER, supra note 22, at 51.
32 STEVEN L. NoK, MARIAGE IN MEN'S LIvEs 66-68 (1999); see also VicroR R.
FucHs, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EMPLOYMENT 60 (1988) (reporting that "mar-
ried men earn more than married women at every age").
Women's income and hours of employment decrease following marriage.
FucHs, supra, at 58-59; see also FRANCINE D. BLAU ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF WOMN,
MEN, AND WORK 95 & tbl.4.4 (1998).
1316 [VOL, 76:5
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whatever reason, or combination of them-responsibility, 3 nagging
by wives,3 societal pressure to conform to the "ideal worker" image,33
or the time freed up by the homemaker's contributions 36-men get a
financial premium from marriage 3
7
The interesting thing, from the perspective of this Article, is that
women do not profit in a similar way from marriage.3a  Cohabitating
relationships tend to be more egalitarian,3 9 and women are more
likely to sacrifice careers for the couples' children or their husbands'
employment during marriage.40 An economist would characterize
33 This seems to be the underlying basis of Nock's book, since he bases ie
changes upon a growth in the man's fundamental masculinity, stating, "Men can
judge themselves as good or bad husbands because the standards of normative mar-
riage are also well-known. Good husbands are mature, faithful, generous fathers and
providers. Good husbands are expected to achieve, to help others, and to remain
true to their promises. Good husbands are good men." Nocx, supra note 32, at 8.
34 See WArr & GALLAGHER, supra note 22, at 55-56. LindaJ. Waite, Dou Marriage
Matter, 32 DEMOGRAP'HY 483, 488 (1995), argues that wives "nag" their husbands into
better behavior.
35 For descriptions of an "ideal worker" who has the support of a homemaker
spouse, see JOAN Wni.ss, UNBENIDING GENDRs WvHY FAMILY,%AN-D WORK CoNFLur AND
WNxr- To Do ABOUT IT 1-6 (2000), andJoan Williams, Gender tw~: &fless Women in
the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. R-v. 1559, 1619 (1991).
36 See Fucss, supra note 32, at 60. See generally AtuE Hoci-iscuiD & Axm
MACHuNG, THE SscoND SHmr (1989) (arguing that women's struggles in the work-
place are due to men's unwillingness to share in child-rearing and housework).
37 See Fucws, supra note 32, at 58-60; see also NocK, supra note 32, at 66, app. at
143 (using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth: 1979-1993, shoing that the
same married men earn $4260.85 more than before they were married, holding age
constant).
38 See Nock, supra note 30, at 243 ("In their physical and mental health, social
life, and overall satisfaction, marriage gives men more than it gives women. More
interestingly, men appear to benefit from marriage regardless of the quality of the
union. When women benefit from marriage, it is because they are part of a satis ing
relationship.").
39 As Steven Nock puts it, "Cohabiting couples are more likely than married part-
ners to believe that men and women should share equally in household chores, even
while they tend to perform such tasks like married couples do.... [C]ohabiting
couples are less committed to performance." STEN L. Noc NMiRLGE W, MEN's
Lrvxs 16 (1998).
40 This makes sense because only over the very long run will some of these "in-
vestments" bear fruit. Marriage and divorce laws also protect spouses who make
them. The economic model of marriage is explained in relatively simple terms in
Robert A. Moffitt, Female Wages, Male Wages, and the Economic Modd of Marriag The
Basic Evidene, in THE TIEs THAT BIND: PERSPECTrES ON AMARGE AND Com,%BrIo N
302, 303-06 (LindaJ. Waite ed., 2000). Much of the work on the economics of house-
holds began with Gary Becker. See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Maniage: Part I, 81 J.
POL EcoN. 813 (1973); Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Marriage: Part II, 82J. PoL. EcoN.
S11 (1974); see also G~ARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE F4 .sfLv 30-53 (enlarged ed.
20)011 1317
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this qualitative difference between the married and unmarried as a
problem in joint production.
The economist Armen Alchian tells the story of the individual
fishermen who join together to take advantage of specialization and
the economies of scale:41 Eventually, even as they add units of labor
and capital until the marginal product of each is equal to marginal
cost, they encounter another problem, which he calls the problem of
team production.42 It is the same problem in miniature as the one
faced by socialist economies, 43 as well as by corporations'"4 and
marriages.
45
Marriage, like fishing, involves commitment and sharing.40 Ex-
periences are shared, enjoyment is shared, work is shared, and income
is shared. What, then, is the problem? The problem is that, when
more than one person works on a complicated project so that exact
input is hard to measure and one receives an equal share of the out-
come, there is a tendency to shirk.47 The more people involved or the
more complicated the task, the easier it is to shirk successfully. Even-
tually the risks of being caught are so small that only the saint-like will
1991) (presenting an economic analysis of such family matters as division of labor,
procreative decisions, and divorce). For a recent argument, see VArr & GALACItir,
supra note 22, at 108-09.
The mechanism for making these investments through marriage and enforcing
them at divorce is discussed in June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Mar-
riage: Feminist Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. REV. 953, 959
(1991).
41 See ARMEN ALcHIAN & WILLIAM R. ALLEN, EXCHANGE & PRODUCrIoN: COWPETI-
TIoN, COORDINATION, & CONTROL 163-70 (3d ed. 1983); see also Armen A. Alchian &
Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AMt. EcoN.
REV. 777, 779-81 (1972) (describing the concept of "team production").
42 See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 41, at 779-82.
43 For a classic argument, see generally Fnmmucl A. HAEx, INDIVIDUALISM AND
EcoNoMIc ORDER 119-47 (1949).
44 See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REv. 247, 300-04 (1999).
45 See Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing
with Paper Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation under No-Fault, 60 U. Cr. L. REv.
67, 93 (1993); see also Saul Levmore, Unconditional Relationships, 76 B.U. L. RLv. 807,
825 (1996) (explaining "the relevance of marriage to the communitarian perspective
on the suitability of bargain" by looking at unenforceable marriage contracts); Eliza-
beth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225,
1270-80 (1998) (discussing principles for distributing "the surplus from the marital
bargain").
46 For an analysis of what wives and husbands perceive as "fair," see Herbert L.
Smith et al., Identfing Underlying Dimensions in Spouses' Evaluations of Fairness in the
Division of Household Labor, 27 Soc. Sci. REs. 305, 323-25 (1998).
47 ALCHAN & ALLEN, supra note 41, at 170.
[VOL- 76:51318
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resist the temptation and continue working to the maximum (accord-
ing to his ability) to receive an equal share (according to his need).
The economic term for this general problem is the principal-agent
question.48
A different, and perhaps more familiar, view of the same problem
is the Prisoner's Dilemma game.49 In group enterprises, societies, and
families, happiness and wealth are maximized when everyone contrib-
utes one hundred percent to the venture.50 Still, the actor knows that
the best individual outcome is achieved by being the only shirker
when everyone else exerts maximum effort.51
There are several strategies for reducing shirking. One is to em-
ploy a residual claimant who monitors those who use effort and de-
cides how much to reward each person.52 In the family, usually both
spouses live in the marital home; therefore, they are residual claim-
ants for or ultimate beneficiaries of housework,5 3 but they may have
entirely different values for what is acceptable housekeeping. This re-
sults in the familiar "gender war" of "I'd be glad to do the wash, but I
don't mind not doing underwear for two weeks." 4
48 Sei; ag., Stephen A. Ross, The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem,
Am. ECON. REv., May 1973, at 134, 138; see alsoJoseph E. Stiglitz, Principal and Agent
(ii), in 3 THE NEW PALGRAvE: A DIcTIoNARY OF ECONOMICS 966-71 (Joln Eatwell etal.
eds., 1987) (identifying the "central problem of economic incentives" as the principal-
agent problem).
49 This is described inJAcI¢ HIRsImmrm, PRicE TnxoRvow Arucxr-,noxs 283-86,
518 (1988). The idea is that two prisoners accused of a common crime are separated
and questioned separately. See id. at 283. Each is told that if he confesses, he will get
a reduced punishment See id. at 283-84. If neither confesses, both uill go free be-
cause there will not be enough evidence. See id. at 284. The theory is that they will
both confess if they cannot tommunicate, because for each that is the lowest risk
strategy. See id. For applications to family law, see, for example, Antony I. Dnes,
Applications of Economic Analysis to Marital Law: Concerning a Proposal to Reform the Discre-
tionary Approach to the Division of Marital Assets in England and Wales, 19 Ir'L. RL%. L &
EcoN. 533, 538-39 (1999); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Matl Discourse and Moral Neutrality
in Divorce Law, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 605, 646; Scott & Scott, supra note 45, at 1294-95.
For applications to children, see Paula England & Nancy Folbre, 111o Should Pay for the
Kids?, 563 ANNms AM. AcAD. PoL & Soc. Sci. 194, 203 (1999).
50 England & Folbre, supra note 49, at 203.
51 See id.
52 Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 41, at 781-82.
53 See, ag., BECKER, supra note 40, at 30-32 (discussing shirking and
specialization).
54 See Silbaugh, supra note 22, at 13-14. See generally WiLuw.%s, supra note 35, at
145-76 (describing how gender wars "take on elements of class and race conflict").
20011
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
This may be one explanation for why marriages are more stable
when, holding other things constant,55 either men or women do tradi-
tional "men's work." "Men's work" contributes to the value of exter-
nally verifiable (and objectively priced) things such as homes and
cars.56 "Women's work" contributes to the far more speculative
(though important) value of increased comfort and well-being.5
7
These more hedonic contributions are important for reasons we have
noted already-married men do better than their otherwise
equivalent single counterparts on every scale in such diverse areas as
employment, job responsibility and salary, health, longevity, mental
health, and participation in social groups.
5 8
The perception and reality here are the same: Women do
disproportionately more housework even when both spouses
are employed.5 9 Income is shared if the spouses remain togeth-
55 We hold constant other possible contributors to divorce or stability: each
spouse's income and education, children, race, divorce in their parent's background,
cohabitation, length of marriage, age at marriage.
56 Steven L. Nock & Margaret F. Brinig, Weak Men and Disorderly Women: Divorce
and the Division of Labor (manuscript at 20, on file with author), in MARR1Aml ANv
DIVORCE: A LAW AND ECONOMIcS APPROACH (forthcoming 2001).
57 The widely publicized, unusually high dollar divorce of Lorna and Gary Wendt,
the former CEO of General Electric Capital, provides a good example of this dichot-
omy. See Wendt v. Wendt, 1998 WL 161165 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 1998). For
some of the popular literature, see Stanley Bing, Keep Your Mitts Off My Options, Dear!,
FORTuNE, Feb. 2, 1998, at 51; Lisa Reilly Cullen, A Headliner Divorce Teaches You leon' to
Get a Fairer Share from Your Spouse, MONEY, Feb. 1998, at 20. While the rationale used
by the court is hardly clear, from the order it is apparent that Mrs. Wendt successfully
claimed that she should be entitled to some of the vast wealth and income of her
husband, because she provided significant "backup" for Mr. Wendt. See Wendt, 1998
WL 161165, at "3. In other words, because she was a model housewife (as the trial
court said, she was "an excellent representative of motherhood, very organized, a very
good cook" who " ' even did windows,'" id. at *7), she relieved him of many of the
strains he would otherwise have had in managing his busy schedule. Because lie did
not have to worry about his personal life, he could work long hours and come home
drained. See id. She also attempted to argue that she gave up her career as a piano
instructor or public school teacher as what we have termed a marital sacrifice. Id.
She said she had stopped working because of Gary Wendt's business requirements,
but the court found that it was her voluntary choice so "she could go on luxury trips
with him." Id. In other words, she had made no real sacrifice. Nonetheless, the court
awarded her very substantial assets (more than $8,000,000) and support primarily be-
cause she "did give the defendant's career priority in her life," because both parties
were part of the "GE team," and because she was a "team player." Id. at *8.
58 NOCK, supra note 32, at 3-5, 13-15.
59 See infra Table 1; see also Bianchi & Spain, supra note 22, at 31-32; Coverman &
Sheley, supra note 22, at 420. Women are apparently both more committed and more
dependent than are men. See Steven L. Nock, Comparison of Marriages and Cohabiting
Relationships, 16J. FAM~. IssuEs 53, 66 tbl. 1 (1995).
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er.60 If they divorce, the spouse with the higher income keeps it or
pays the other only a token or time-limited amount in spousal sup-
port 61 Some writers believe that lifetime income-sharing is an inte-
gral part of marriage. 62 The part of me believing in covenant
agrees,63 but I would not limit the sharing to finances. The spouses
also are residual claimants for "parental consumption"" and so
should be dividing parenting responsibility more or less evenly as
well.65 But here again, what succeeds in the commercial firm may not
be a good analogy, since the spouses probably get entirely different
levels of satisfaction from their minor children.G6
In addition to establishing residual claims, another strategy to de-
feat shirking is to "pay by the piece," rewarding as each small job is
done.67 A division of dudes works for routine or small tasks because
the degree of effort is obvious and can be quickly assessed.6s Of
course, assessment may come too late, as it did for two of my friends,
both lawyers, who had their phone disconnected twice because the
"spouse in charge," the husband, forgot to pay the bill. Strategic be-
havior may be involved here as well.69 The outcome for this particular
couple is that the wife now pays the utility bills.
60 See infra Table 1.
61 See iL
62 See, eg., MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY L~w AND THE PuRsurr OF l,-n.,tcv
146-47 (1993);Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and GenderJustice, 67 N.C. L RE%. 1103,
1121 (1989). Chapter 5 goes some way towards making compensatory payments more
permanent. See ALI PRIcNIPL.Es (Proposed Final Draft 1997), supra note 27, § 5.07.
63 See MARGARET F. BRINIG, FROM CONTRACT TO CoNx.tm ar. Bvo\,, THE Lw ,%AN
ECONOMiCS OF THE FAMILY 31 (2000).
64 Children provide smiles, entertainment, and achievements for their parents.
See, e-g, Margaret F. Brinig, The Family Frandise: Elderly Parents and Adult Siblings, 1996
UTAH L REv. 393, 408-14.
65 They do not seem to do so during most marriages, see Cathleen D. Zick &Jane
L. McCullough, Trends in Married Couples' Time Use: Evidence from 1977-78 and
1987-88, 24 SEX RouS 459, 472-73 (1991); therefore, equal time sharing would not
be the custody regime I would advocate upon divorce. For my position, which favors
adoption of the ALI Pzinciples' "approximation" regime, see Margaret F. Brinig &
Douglas IV. Allen, "These Boots Are Made for Walking": I My Most Divorce Filers Are Women,
2 AM. L. & EcoN. REv. 126, 157 (2000).
66 See Margaret F. Brinig & Michael V. Alexeev, Trading at Divorce: Preferences, Legal
Rules and Transaction Costs, 8 OHIO ST.J. oN Disp. REsOI- 279, 288-89 (1993) (discuss-
ing differing utility).
67 Steven N. S. Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J.L & Econ. 1, 6
(1983).
68 See id at 6-7.
69 That is, the husband may be trying to get out of doing the job by doing such a
badjob that the wife takes over in disgust. Cf Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draft.
ees: The Strugglefor Parental Equaliy, 38 UCLA L RE%. 1415, 1456 (1991) (child care).
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Piecework is related to a third shirking-reduction strategy, which
is to divide the entire project into such small parts that there really is
nojoint production except in the aggregate. 70 Although the monitor-
ing effort is simplified, the gains from coordination that stem from
the smoothness of the entire operation are correspondingly dimin-
ished.71 Participaflts need to stop whatever they are doing for report-
ing, the domestic equivalent of clock-punching or paperwork. In fact,
an exchange relationship produces less satisfaction 72 than one taking
an "internal stance '73 central to a meaningful interpersonal relation-
ship. In marriage, a relationship based upon short-run exchanges sig-
nals instability.
A final strategy to reduce shirking (or equalize work) is to create
a very large incentive to maximize the joint effort.7 4 This device is
used by coaches giving pep talks to their teams, political leaders dur-
ing "Fireside Chats," or family members supporting reunions. In mar-
riage, the duration of the relationship 75 and the ideal-if not the
See generally Williams, supra note 35, at 1599 & n.221 (discussing the inequitable distri-
bution of household labor).
70 See Cheung, supra note 67, at 8.
71 See id. at 9-10.
72 Gary L. Hanson, Moral Reasoning and the Marital Exchange Relationship, 131 J.
SoC. PSYCHOL. 71, 79-81 (1991) ("[Bleing exchange oriented may adversely affect
marital happiness.").
73 MILTON C. REGAN, JR., ALONE TOGETHER: LovE AND THE MEANING OF MARRIAGE
24 (1999). Regan earlier defined that internal stance in marriage as
a universe of shared meaning that serves as the taken-for-granted back-
ground for individual conduct. At this moment, a spouse stands "inside" the
marriage as a participant who accepts its claims, not "outside" it as an ob-
server who calls those claims into question. This stance makes possible the
experience of lives lived in intimate concern, rather than mere parallel
association.
Milton C. Regan, Jr., SpousalPivilege and the Meanings of Marriage, 81 VA. L. REv. 2045,
2049 (1995).
74 Cf Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and the State of Nature, 1 J.L. EcoN.
ORG. 5, 15-18 (1985) (arguing that the use of collateral-something valued by both
parties-helps to insure that promises will be kept without resorting to threats or
violence).
75 See Nock, supra note 30, at 240-41; see also Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley,
Joint Custody: Bonding and Monitoring Theories, 73 IND. LJ. 393, 402-04 (1998) (discuss-
ing how a long-term relationship with children acts as a bond between the parents;
also discussing the concept of "hands-tying") [hereinafter Brinig & Buckley, Joint Cus-
tody]; Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, No-Fault Laws and at Fault People, 18 INr'L
REV. L. & ECON. 325, 329-30 (1998) (noting that when divorce was more difficult,
people had incentives to invest more in marriage).
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fact-of love give strong incentives to make the marriage work.76 No-
fault divorce has unfortunately diminished many of the values of these
incentives, particularly because the legal residual claimant for some
investments (such as children or professional degrees) tends to be
only one spouse.7 7 Putting a spouse through a graduate education, or
accommodating the demands of a rising corporate star or military of-
ficer,78 or building a strong relationship with children will benefit the
marriage only, or at best primarily, if it remains intact.7 Consequently,
the non-student spouse may well choose not to delay her own educa-
tion or not to live at a reduced standard of living to finance her hus-
band's education, if she thinks it likely that the marriage will break up
before the couple gets to enjoy the benefits of the increased earning
ability.80 Another consequence is that the father may choose not to
spend tremendous amounts of time with his children, if he feels that
they will be "taken away" and his relationship with them sabotaged by
a vindictive former wife.8 ' On the other hand, ajoint custody statute
that encourages relationships with children after divorce strengthens
the incentives.8 2 Perhaps because the invested father values his chil-
dren more and realizes that divorce is hard on them, there are fewer
divorces where joint custody legislation is in place.83 Some sort of
guaranteed income sharing (whether or not the marriage contin-
ues)84 should work the same way to keep marriages together and
76 For a discussion of marriage vows as hortatory, see Scott & Scott, supra note 45,
at 1230.
77 See Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Marriage and Opportunism, 23 J.
L c.AL SrUD. 869, 885-86 (1994); see also RIcHARD A. Pos.ER, Ecoxo.mic Am LYsS OF
Law 146-48 (4th ed. 1992) (noting the economic importance of one spouse's "non-
pecuniary contributions").
78 See H. Leroy Gill & Donald R. Marvin, Wherever He May Go: How Wies Affect
Their Husband's Career Deisions, 27 Soc. Sc. RES. 264, 277 (1998). Decisions about
remaining in the service or leaving it are influenced by potential implications for the
vife, especially her earnings capacity. However, traditional men make career deci-
sions without much concern for their wives. Id
79 See, eg.,Joan Krauskopf, Recompense forFinandng Spouse'sEducation: Legal Protec-
tion of the Marital Investor in Human Capita4 28 KAN. L RE,. 379, 387 (1980).
80 For a general empirical discussion of why this may explain women's increased
labor force participation, see Parkman, supra note 22.
81 One very angry father who apparently feels this way is Robert E. Fay, The Disen-
franchised Father, 36 AnvA CEs IN P.DxATiucs 407, 413-14 (1989).
82 See Brinig & Buckley, Joint Custody, supra note 75, at 402.
83 Seeid-
84 See, eg., ALI PRamcIPLEs (Proposed Final Draft 1997), supra note 27, §§ 5.03,
5.05 (providing for compensation for the loss in living standard experienced at disso-
lution by the spouse with less wealth or earning capacity in a marriage of significant
duration). Compare June Carbone, Income Sharing: Redefining the Family in Terms of
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counterbalance the distinction between less easily unverifiable (wo-
men's work) and verifiable (men's work) investments in the
marriage.85
II. COSTS OF SHARING
Gary Becker's disciples and feminist scholars agree that one of
the essential components of marriage is sharing.8 6 This point is where
the similarity of their viewpoints ends, however. For law and econom-
ics proponents, sharing evolves naturally from comparative advantage
and specialization.8 7 Since the wife (specialist in household produc-
tion) cannot recoup her human capital investments if the marriage
ends, the husband, who retains his market investments, must compen-
sate her with alimony.88 The more specialized the couple, the more
efficient the marriage.8 9 According to this view, alimony is a perma-
nent feature of the marriage landscape. 90 For some feminists, on the
other hand, income sharing is at best a temporary expedient, at worst
an anchor to an inequitable system in which men exploit and domi-
nate women.91 If men and women were truly equal, they would not so
Community, 31 Hous. L. REv. 359, 414-15 (1994) ("Income sharing proposals insist on
recognition of this reconstituted community, of the custodial family's continuing
claim on the absent parent's income, and of the identity of interests between custo-
dial parent and child."), with Singer, supra note 62, at 1121 (sharing of spousal in-
come for the benefit of wife, who may or may not have children, after long-term
marriage).
85 Cf Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 Nw. U.
L. REV. 65, 142-43 (1998) (arguing that monetary contracts should not be enforced
because nonmonetary contracts are not enforced; "monetary and nonmonetary com-
ponents of marriage need to be treated equally in order to properly value unpaid
family labor").
86 BECKER, supra note 40, at 30-31 ("Virtually all societies have developed long-
term protection for married women; one can even say that 'marriage' is defined by a
long-term commitment between a man and a woman."); see also Douglas W. Allen,
"What Does She See in Him?: The Effect of Sharing on the Choice of Spouse, 30 EcON, IN.
QUIRY 57, 66 (1992).
87 See Allen, supra note 86, at 66.
88 See Landes, supra note 22, at 44-45. This concept first surfaced in the legal
literature in Krauskopf, supra note 79, at 388.
89 BECKER, supra note 40, at 33. For a criticism, see Margaret F. Brinig, Comment
onjana Singer's Alimony and Efficiency, 82 GEo. L.J. 2461, 2469-73 (1994) (finding
that a household is not efficient if diminishing returns to scale and psychic costs as
well as financial gains are considered).
90 Brinig, supra note 89, at 2470 n.58.
91 See Marsha Garrison, Marriage: The Status of Conduct, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 1039,
1060 (1983) (book review); Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal of Californias No-Fault Di-
vorce Law, 75 GA.. L. REV. 291, 309 (1987); Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A
Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 80, 85 (1987).
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much specialize, but rather, share household and market work.9 2
Both husband and wife would participate in the marketplace to the
extent that this made them happy.93 Both would participate in child
rearing and in any other household tasks for which the market did not
provide a satisfactory substitute.
94
The consequences of sharing take a tangible form in the concept
of alimony and property distribution. Feminists agree that realizing
the dream of sharing has remained elusive in the vast majority of mar-
riages.95 Women still perform most household jobs and consequently
earn only about three quarters as much as their male counterparts. 6
Here the feminist group splits. Some maintain that alimony should
serve as a transitional or stop-gap measure for homemakers displaced
because of the change in legal and social regimes. 97 Because they
grew up, married, and stayed home with children in the reasonable
expectation that either the marriage would continue or they would be
awarded alimony, basic fairness requires compensation for the
changes wrought by divorce reform and gender equality.93 A minority
argues that the promise of alimony discourages potential wives and
mothers from investing in their own human capital to the optimal
extent, reinforcing dependence, male oppression, and a society in
which women can never be players without handicapsY9 The ALI's
proposed solution is to give long term-even permanent-compensa-
tion, for career losses suffered because of investments in the marriage,
92 See Brinig, supra note 22, at 59.
93 Brinig, supra note 89, at 2472 ("[N]either spouse really benefits from 'all work
and no life,' as my teenage daughter puts it. Society does not benefit either, as the
line for the couple's joint benefits shows.").
94 For many couples, home cooking, home nursing when one spouse is ill, and,
certainly, sexual pleasure fall into this category.
95 See, e.g., Bea Ann Smith, The Partnership Theory of Marriage: A Borrowed Solution
Fails, 68 TEx. L REv. 689, 695-96 (1990); Williams, supra note 35, at 1619.
96 This is a somewhat circular proposition since wives rationally choose house-
hold production because of their lower opportunity costs of remaining out of the job
market. See Silbaugh, supra note 22, at 17-21; Wax, supra note 22, at 530.
97 See, eg., Carbone, supra note 84, at 413-15; Jana B. Singer, Alimony and Effi-
ciency: The Gendered Costs and Benefits of the EconomicJustflcalion forAlimony, 82 GEO. LJ.
2423, 2454 (1994); Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemalrw A Discourse on
Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Faul, 60 U. Ctn. L RE%.
67, 70-71 (1993).
98 See sources cited supra note 97.
99 See Kay, An Appraisal of Caifornia's No-Fault Divorce Law, supra note 91, at
317-18; Wendy IV. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and
Feminism, in FEmqwsr LEGAL THEORY. READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER 15, 22-25 (Katha-
rine T. Bartlett & Roseanne Kennedy eds., 1991).
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including for the couple's children. 100 This would seem to satisfy the
first group of feminists, but not the second.
Thus, the characterization of sharing also matters because it so
dominates the rationale for alimony and property distribution. The
couple's investment in the reputation of their marital family, as well as
its material goods, will continue to bear fruit even after divorce.' 0'
(Thus, many years after their divorce, one of my former colleagues
confesses to true pleasure in his former wife's successful legal career.
He is also very proud of their joint achievement, their adult son.)
These ongoing portions of the marriage covenant are what I refer to
as franchise. 10 2 Arguably, the part of the relationship that continues,
but that may not be currently recognized by law, should be taken into
account in determining alimony.103 If we compensate according to
the franchise nature of the post-divorce relationship, the key concept
will be the investment in one's spouse or in the relationship.104 If we
do not recognize franchise interests, alimony will instead compensate
for opportunities foregone or as an incentive mechanism to promote
optimal marriage behavior. 105
The point that what a supporting spouse contributes to another's
earning capacity should be considered an investment rather than a
simple loss is explored most carefully in the Iowa case of In re Marriage
100 ALI PiNcniLEs (Proposed Final Draft 1997), supra note 27, § 5.05.
101 For a lengthy discussion of this "franchise" concept, see Brinig, supra note 64.
See also BRINIG, supra note 63, at 181-207 (describing the "family franchise"-relation-
ships that exist after the legal bonds of family have been broken).
102 The concept is defined for families in BRINIG, supra note 63, at 7. Briefly, it
refers to the portion of a covenant family that remains when the legal relationship
between participants ends at adoption, emancipation, or divorce.
103 See Margaret F. Brinig, Property Distribution Physics: The Talisman of Time and
Middle Class Law, 31 Fnm. L.Q. 93, 106-13 (1997) (discussing why the prevailing
"clean break" theory of divorce doesn't fit what happens in most dissolving families);
Rosemary Shaw Sackett & Cheryl K. Munyon, Alimony: A Retreat from Traditional Con-
cepts of Spousal Support, 35 DRAKE L. REv. 297, 302 (1986) ("With the bitterness that
frequently follows a dissolution, the ideal situation would be to put the parties' eco-
nomic differences to rest with the property division. Where possible, each party
should be given his or her own separate assets.").
104 To some extent this is captured in Chapters 4 and 5 of the ALI Princides,
though in them spouses are compensated at dissolution for career losses occasioned
by these investments. In other words, loss (sacrifice) is the basis rather than gain
(investment), though the ALI Principles are couched in terms of earning capacity
rather than non-human capital assets. See BRINIG, supra note 63, at 171 & n.202 (re-
ferring to ALI PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft 1997), supra note 27, § 4.07(1), cmt,
A). The rationale for equating property distribution and compensatory payments is
discussed. See id. at 100-01.
105 See Ira Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1, 50-51 (1989).
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of Francis,o 6 in which the supporting wife actually received a sum that
represented not her loss in earning capacity (since she had worked
throughout), 0 7 nor reimbursement for the amount she had contrib-
uted to supporting her husband and securing money for his tui-
tion, 08 but rather a return on the share of the investment she had
made. 0
9
Although sharing in some form is central to marriage, it is obvi-
ous that the feminist ideal of shared housework has not been realized
even when most married women work outside the home.110 Time
studies chronicle the daily behavior of husbands and wives, mothers
and fathers, and unmarried cohabitants. 1 In each of these situa-
tions, labor is sharply divided, even when both adults work at full-time
jobs. Most routine household tasks are done by women, who also per-
106 442 N.W.2d 59 (Iowa 1989). It was a medical-degree case with facts that made
the supporting wife's case rather more sympathetic than in the more well-knorm Ma-
honey case that appears in most casebooks. Sce Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527
(N.J. 1982). The court in Francis reasoned that an investment in a professional de-
gree, like any other asset that earns money, comes from two sources: labor and capi-
tal. SeeFrancis, 442 N.W.2d at 65. Labor contributions come entirely from the spouse
in school. Contributions to capital, on the other hand, can come from either spouse.
These contributions may be in cash or in kind-through earnings in the labor force
or relieving the student spouse of the labor of caring for the house and the children.
Although the returns on labor vary enormously, economists regard the returns on
capital as quite predictable and easy to measure. (Financial institutions make such
calculations all the time when they establish interest rates for lending money.) Sre id.
The expert witness who testified in Francis said the conventional ratio of labor to
capital in investments is seventy to thirty. See id. The spouse seeking a return on
investment, instead of recompense for career loss, would multiply the wdue of the
advanced degree (or other earnings enhancement) times thirty percent times the
proportion of the capital investment he or she had made. See generally BUNIG, supra
note 63, at 110-12 (providing a general discussion of the type of calculation that
would be warranted).
107 She had an in-home daycare business. SeeFrancis, 442 N.W.2d at 61. The court
noted: "From the outset of their marriage, Thomas and Diana agreed that Diana
would care for their children and earn income for the family by caring for other
people's children in their home. This arrangement continued throughout the mar-
riage except for a brief period shortly after Melissa was born." Id. at 64.
108 I. at 64-65 ("During the summer before medical school began, Thomas
worked as a gardener and earned approximately $1200. Diana earned roughly $5000
per year from her in-home day care business. Thomas' parents contributed $11,500
and Diana's mother gave them $12,000. Student loans accounted for $45,500 over
the six-year period.").
109 Id at 65.
110 See Nock & Brinig, supra note 56 (manuscript at 5).
111 See, eg., Bianchi 8 Spain, supra note 22, at 31-33; Coverman & Sheley, supra
note 22, at 420; Nock & Brinig, supra note 56 (manuscript at 5, tbl.1).
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form most of the child care and associated functions.112 Couples di-
vide financial management and grocery shopping more evenly.',,
More men than women take care of cars and yard work, so the couples
typically divide "inside" and "outside" tasks.1 14 As Joan Williams has
written, the labor market expects an "ideal worker," who is almost in-
variably a married man with a homemaker-wife who takes care of most
of the behind-the-scenes work. 115 Because women, even post-Marvin,
still perform these household tasks, eating into their leisure time, they
cannot do as much in the paid job force as the men to whom they are
compared. 116 Thus they earn less, progress more slowly, and have
lower opportunity costs from engaging in household production that
mean their employment sacrifices are more rational than their
mate's.1 1 7 In order to change this pattern, either the ideal worker
concept (characteristic of the labor force) or the (non)sharing of
housework (characteristic of the household) must change. There is
some evidence that both are changing gradually."" Still, the draw-
backs of "women's work," the fact that no one wants to do it, and the
reality that, undercompensated as it is at present, 1 9 it does not add to
112 Fucis, supra note 32, at 73-74; see also Bianchi & Spain, supra note 22, at 32
(reporting that the hours women spend on housework have decreased over ten years,
and "[i]n families in which the wife works outside the home ... husbands perform a
greater share of domestic tasks and child care"); sources cited in Brinig, supra note
89, at 2477 & n.90.
113 Nock & Brinig, supra note 56 (manuscript at 26, tbl.2).
114 Id. People's time is divided roughly into labor, leisure, and housework. Stud-
ies show that women have less leisure time than do men. See, e.g., BEcEtuR, supra note
40, at 76, 2S.1 (reporting that in 1975 to 1976, the average leisure hours for all mar-
ried women was 26.7, for men 27.1 and that, when employed full-time, women had 21
hours of leisure per week, men 23).
115 WiAMS, supra note 35, at 71-72; Williams, supra note 35, at 1596-97.
116 Nock & Brinig, supra note 56 (manuscript at 27, tbl.3).
117 PAULA ENGLAND & GEORGE FARKAS, HOUSEHOLDS, EMPLOYMENT AND GENDER
80-82 (1986); FucHs, supra note 32, at 64.
118 But see WiLLiAMs, supra note 35, at 64-113. See generally FRANCEs IK GoLD-
SCHEIDER & LINDAJ. WAITE, NEW FAMIIEs, No FAMILEs? THE TRANSFOMATION OF THE
AMERCIAN HOME (1991); ARLIE RussELL HocHscHiLD, THE TIME BIND: WHEN WORK
BEcoMEs HOME AND Horm BECOMS WORK (1997) (discussing the increased pardcipa-
tion of women in the workforce).
119 For descriptions of men's and women's work in the paid labor force, see Wil-
liam T. Bielby & James N. Baron, Sex Segregation Within Occupations, Am. ECON. REV.,
May 1986, at 43; Katherine Silbaugh, Grounded Applications: Feminism and Law at the
Millennium, 50 ME. L. REv. 201, 202 (1998); and Shelley Wright, Women and the Global
Economic Order A Feminist Perspective, 10 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 861, 868 (1995).
For examples of the differences in compensation, see BuPEAu OF LABOR STATIS-
TIcs, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT, HouRs, AND EARNINGS, 1981-93
(1993), which reports annual average weekly earnings for 1988 of $461 for carpentry
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marital stability,120 all give some support for the Bruch-Marnin view
that homemakers' contributions need to be valued.
Ill. PRIVACY LMrATIONS ON SHARING
Despite the importance of sharing, spouses do not share every-
thing, despite any intent to "share and share alike." 2 1 They retain
some private spaces as individuals.' 2 2 Some of these involve their in-
nermost thoughts, obviously not the subject of legal proceedings.
Some involve questions of the appropriate involvement of courts "be-
hind the marital veil." 123 Some involve such intimate matters as the
wife's choice of whether or not to bear a child to term.
and floor work, id. at 24, $531 for plumbing, heating, and air conditioning, id. at 21,
and $299 for auto repair, services, and parking, id/. at 438. The same Bureau of Labor
Statistics data shows weekly earnings of $215 for residential care, id. at 463, $146 for
miscellaneous personal services, $214 for laundry, cleaning, and garment services, id.
at 424, and $172 for retail bakeries, id. at 381. In 1985, men employed as repairers
and mechanics earned an average of $400 weekly, compared to the $130 women
earned in private household service. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STTSl-
cAL ABsTRar OF THE UNrrE STATES, 436, tbl.696 (1998).
120 Nock & Brinig, supra note 56 (manuscript at 28-29, tbl.4).
121 See, e.g., AL.A. CODE § 6-10-98 (1975) (marital homestead); OMto R%-. CODE
ANN. § 143.43 (Anderson 1999) (survivor benefits); 31 P.R. Lwvs ANN. § 3621 (1993)
(providing that earnings or profits of a conjugal partnership are divided upon
dissolution).
122 See, ag., KAHLi. GmRAN, On Mariage, in THE PROPHET 15 (1923).
But let there be spaces in your togetherness,
And let the winds of the heavens dance between you.
Love one another, but make not a bond of love:
Let it rather be a moving sea between the shores of your souls.
Id. at 15.
123 See Scott & Scott, supra note 45, at 1302-04. Privacy of course has its dowmside,
particularly for women.
Many feminists, as Dean Bartlett recently observed, have
questioned the premises of family privacy, insisting that just because rela-
tionships are private does not make them beyond public concern. The)'
have challenged the inevitability of naturalness of family privacy, arguing
that where the line is drawn between private and public is itself a highly
discretionary, political act. And they have exposed the hypocrisy of a con-
struct that purports to be neutral but that suppresses recognition of the
kinds of harms from which women disproportionately suffer, while leaving
room for prohibition of the kinds of harms men experience.
Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminism and Family Lau,, 33 FA.t LQ. 475, 475 (1999). See
generallyJana B. Singer, The Privalization of Family Law, 1992 Wis. L RE%. 1443 (explor-
ing the privatization of family law and arguing that this trend brings new dangers for
families).
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The first genre of privacy cases involves time-honored questions,
For many centuries, spouses could not sue each other in tort because
to do so would violate the "marital unity."'1 24 In other words, when
they married, the two became one person, and a person could not sue
himself.125 Although this marital unity has disappeared largely from
the realm of property law,' 26 it still retains some validity in tort, not so
much because of the "unity" concept, but for reasons of privacy.
Courts are afraid that their interference even in more egregious
cases involving intentional torts might encourage suits for such day-to-
day problems as the "uninvited kiss"' 27 and, thus, return spouses to an
accounting or contract-like type of behavior characteristic of the mar-
ket, rather than the firm.'28 The "inviolate veil" of family autonomy12 9
hails from high, and perhaps infinitely high, "transaction costs" to use
the words of economists.'3 0 It is nearly impossible to recall the con-
text of everyday family affairs, particularly when minor slights and ad-
justments go on for years.' 3 ' Nonetheless, modem courts have
abrogated the doctrine for simple unintentional torts, such as auto-
124 There is an extensive discussion of this line of reasoning in the Supreme Court
case of United States v. Tramme4 445 U.S. 40, 43-45 (1980) (discussing immunity from
adverse testimony by a spouse). This reasoning appears in Sundin v. Klein, 269 S.E.2d
787, 790-91 (Va. 1980), where a murdered wife's estate tried to recover property held
by the spouses as "tenants by the entireties."
125 See, eg., Keister's Adm'rv. Keister's Ex'r, 96 S.E. 315, 322 (Va. 1918) (BurkeJ,
concurring) (The duties of marriage "forbid the idea that this 'one flesh' may so
divide itself that either spouse may sue the other."); see also 1 WILLIAM BLAcIsrONE,
CoMmENThrIEs *442.
126 Although the tenancy by the entireties still exists in a few states (for example,
Virginia permits this holding if the intent to create it explicitly appears in the deed,
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-20 (Michie 1995)), and the marital community flourishes in
others, customs like dower and courtesy (giving wives and husbands, respectively,
shares in the property acquired by the other during the marriage) are abolished. For
one of the last holdouts, see VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-19.2 (Michie 1995).
127 Wait v. Pierce, 209 N.W. 475, 482 (Wis. 1926) (Eschweiler, J., dissenting) (not-
ing that allowing suits between spouses would encourage litigation over things so triv-
ial as the unwanted kiss).
128 For a modem example of a court struggling with this problem and ultimately
declining to allow a wife to recover in tort for intentional infliction of emotional dis.
tress, see Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991). The opinion states:
"Even though one may question the utility of such comments, spouses are also free to
express negative opinions of one another. 'You look awful' or even 'I don't love you'
can be very wounding, but these statements cannot justify liability." Id. at 1325.
129 The phrase comes from Menefee v. Commonwealth, 55 S.E.2d 9, 15 (Va. 1949)
(discussing the marital communications privilege).
130 See, eag., DAVID W. BARNEs & LN A. STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND
ECONOMICS 53-60 (1992).
131 See the discussion in Hakkila:
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mobile accidents 3 2 and household injuries, 133 where the parties are
covered by automobile or homeowner's insurance. 34 They have been
more resistant to abolishing the immunity for intentional torts,135 al-
though some courts have allowed suits where the action complained
of was "outrageous" and destroyed any hope of marital unity.136
The second privacy concern involves individual rights on a consti-
tutional level. Despite his obvious interests in and connections with
his unborn child, a husband cannot interfere with his ife's right to
choose whether or not to carry a pregnancy to term. 37 In the more
recent early-term abortion cases, practical interests, like the employ-
ment progress women have made since Roe v. Wadei m and the con-
cerns about abuse, outweighed the interests of the husband.2 9 In
another context, a court rejected a husband's attempt to enforce a
contract made prior to marriage that limited the couple's sexual inter-
course to once a week (while the wife insisted on more). 140 This last
case reveals concerns both about family autonomy and individual pri-
vacy.141 Courts are'loath to pierce the marital veil by entering the
marital bedroom (and an inquiry into the frequency of intercourse, or
requests for intercourse, would have had to accompany the husband's
suit).' 4 2 They are also reluctant to second-guess individual decisions
The connection between the outrageousness of the conduct of one spouse
and the severe emotional distress of the other will likely be obscure. Al-
though the victim spouse may well be suffering severe emotional distress, wis
it caused by the outrageousness of the conduct or by the implied (and privi-
leged) message of antipathy?
Hakkila, 812 P.2d at 1325.
132 Se g., Lewis v. Leis, 351 N.E.2d 526, 532-33 (Mass. 1976).
133 Merenoff v. Merenoff, 388 A.2d 951, 962 (NJ. 1978).
134 See ag., Surratt v. Thompson, 183 S.E.2d 200, 202 (Va. 1971).
135 For a survey, see generally Robert G. Spector, Marital Torts: The Current Legal
Landscape, 33 FRs. L.Q. 745 (1999) (outlining the tort actions that are currently avail-
able in the marital context).
136 See, eg., Eagan v. Calhoun, 698 A.2d 1097, 1099 (Md. 1997). See generally
Note, Litigation Between Husband and Wirfe, 79 HARt. L RE,. 1650, 1659-63 (1966), for
an old version of the doctrine and Singer, supra note 123, at 1463-64, for a modem
feminist approach.
137 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 893-94 (1992).
138 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
139 Casey, 505 U.S. at 889-94.
140 Favrot v. Burns, 332 So. 2d 873, 875 (La. Ct. App. 1976).
141 See Bartlett, supra note 123, at 488-94 (discussing feminist concerns about sex
and reproductive issues).
142 Cf. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,521 (1961) (finding that a law prohibiting the
"use" of contraceptives "reaches into the intimacies of the marriage relationship";
proof of its violation involves "an invasion of privacy that is implicit in a free society");
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about marital sexuality, a matter over which each individual spouse
has complete control.1
43
Although the strongest claims of marital privacy supported the
concept that a man could not rape his wife, violent sexual assault vio-
lates covenant promises like the injunction that- the husband is to
"love his wife as his own body."' 44 Once married women were ac-
corded fights as people and citizens, 145 the ancient common-law im-
munity from marital rape charges 146 necessarily disappeared as well.
The assent to marriage was no longer seen as blanket consent to inter-
course at the husband's demand.' 47 Once the abortion cases fixed
matters involving sexuality firmly within individual control, the hus-
band's immunity from rape became a dead letter,148 though there is
still a difference between marital rape and stranger rape in many state
statutes. 149 (Of course the proof problems, troublesome in most sex-
ual assault cases, become still more intractable in marital rape
cases. 150 )
id. at 548-49 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (discussing contraceptive use by married
couples).
143 See In rePamela P. v. Frank S., 443 N.Y.S.2d 343, 346 (Fam. Ct. 1981) ("Consti-
tutional doctrine as to procreative freedom has developed mainly in the context of
women's rights. There can be no question, however, that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution guarantees to a man equally with a woman freedom of
choice to use contraception and avoid procreation.") (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438, 448-49, 453 (1972)).
144 Ephesians 5:28.
145 See PEGGy A. RABaDN, FATHE TO DAUGHTERS: THE LEc:AL FOUNDATIONS OF FE-
MALE EMANCIPATION 154-55 (1980). See generally RICHARD H. CHusED, PRIVATE AcTS IN
PUBLIC PLACEs: A SocIAL HIsTORy OF DIVORCE IN THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN
FAMILY LAW (1994) (noting the connection between Married Women's Property Acts
and the availability ofjudicial divorce); Reva B. Siegal, Home as Work: The First Womnan's
Rights Claims Concerning Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE LJ. 1073 (1994)
(exploring the rise and retreat of the movement for joint property advocacy).
146 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK& FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLIuS
LAW 436 (2d ed. reprint 1923) (1898).
147 1 MATHmV HALE, THE HIs;TORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 629 (1736).
148 See, ag., State v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38, 42-43 (N.J. 1981). Further, no-fault di-
vorce gave the wife the right to voluntarily withdraw from the marital relationship,
terminating any such marital contract. See Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, 315 S.E.2d
847, 855 (Va. 1984).
149 See, eg., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57.2 (Michie 1996) (criminalizing marital sexual"
assault); id. § 18.2-67.2:1 (requiring marital sexual assault to be reported within sixty
days of the offense). See generally Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History
of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1373 (2000) (describing the evolution of marital rape
laws from the 19th century to today).
150 See, ag., Kizer v. Commonwealth, 321 S.E.2d 291, 294 (Va. 1984).
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The last several paragraphs have described the privacy concerns
surrounding married couples in legal terms. The same phenomena
may be analyzed in an institutional economic framework as well. The
first set of problems-involving over-regulating the marriage-are
rather like the concerns leading to the concept of "bounded rational-
ity" as a limitation on the complete contingent claims contract. 1s In
other words, spelling out all the terms of a contract and enforcing
each minute detail would itself be destructive of many long-term rela-
tional contracts, 5 2 whether commercial or marital.153 In marriage,
this point explains why there are not more antenuptial (or premari-
tal) agreements-the necessary negotiation and specificity take some
of the bloom off the most romantic relationshipI S4 In the commer-
cial parallel, if managers or employees of a business firm had to be
continually afraid of lawsuits for the most trivial of matters, much
worthwhile business simply would not get done.15 Similarly, over-
regulating a marriage, or what Milton Regan calls "the external
stance,"156 hurts marriages by encouraging a constant reexamination
of whether continued confidence in or loyalty to the other spouse is
worthwhile. Even if all things in a marriage could be foreseen, spe-
cific enforcement of marital promises may be harmful.1t 7 Finally,
some of the qualities that make up a good marriage are simply incom-
151 See Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contrac-
tual Relations, 22J. L. & EcoN. 233, 258 (1979); see also Scott & Scott, supra note 45, at
1228-29 (arguing that marriage can and should be analyzed as a long-term relational
contract).
152 See CharlesJ. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts 67 V. L
REV. 1089, 1092-93 (1981).
153 See Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational DecisionmakingAbout Aarridage and Divorce, 76 VA.
L REv. 9, 42-44 (1990).
154 See id. at 50; Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Afarriage: A New
Modelfor State Policy, 70 CA. L RE%. 204,209 (1982). One other reason is that couples
during engagement are convinced that their particular marriage will not end in di-
vorce, although they are aware that half of all marriages will. Lynn A. Baker & Robert
E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce
at the Time of Afaniage, 17 Lmw & HUM. BEHAv. 439, 443 (1993) (observing that "the
median response of the marriage license applicants ias 0o when assessing the likeli-
hood that they personally would divorce").
155 See generaly Saul Levmore, Love It or Leave It: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Exclusivity of Remedies in Partnership and Marriage, 58 LAw & Co.vmw. PRaos. 221
(1995) (comparing the "love-it-or-leave-it" rule of marriage dissolution to partnership
law).
156 Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spousal Privilege and the Meanings of Marriage, 81 VA. L
REv. 2045, 2049 (1995).
157 Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorc, and Quasi Rents; or, "I Gave Him the Best Years of
My Life, - 16J. LEGAL STUD. 267, 300-02 (1987).
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mensurable,15 8 so that courts may have difficulty dealing with them
because they are at the same time such wonderfully familiar and incal-
culably worthwhile attributes.
Recent empirical work by Margaret Brinig and Steven Nock1 "
shows why one consequence of diminished specialization leads to mar-
ital instability. Couples studied in the National Survey of Families and
Households 160 were asked, along with many other questions, how
many hours they (and their spouses) spent working each week in the
paid labor force or on specific household tasks. 161 Meal preparation,
shopping, washing dishes, and doing laundry were among the tradi-
tional "women's tasks," while household repair and auto maintenance
were among those usually thought of as "men's work."'162 The results
for each couple were compared and found to be highly consistent.
163
Five years later, the same couples were surveyed again.'6 Brinig and
Nock found that couples in which either husband or wife spent more
than the median time doing "women's work" in 1987-1988 were sig-
nificantly more likely to have divorced or separated by the second sur-
vey, taken five years later. 65 These results remain robust even when
the usual indicators of marital stability are held constant and even
when labor force employment hours and income are included. 166
On the other hand, when either husband or wife spent more time
than the median doing "men's work" in the earlier period, the couple
was significantly less likely to experience divorce or separation by the
second survey.' 67 Finally, couples who refused to answer the house-
158 See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MIcHi. L. RL-v.
779, 814-16 (1994).
159 See generally Nock & Brinig, supra note 56 (demonstrating "how husbands' in-
volvement in women's tasks and wives' involvement in men's tasks affects the chances
of marital disruption .... explorting] the extent to which attitudes, as opposed to fair
division of labor, matter for marital stability").
160 See id. (manuscript at 6).
161 SeeJames Sweet et al., The Design and Content of the National Survey ofFamilies and
Households, in CENTER FOR DEMOGRAPHY AND EcoLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-
MADISON, NATIONAL SURVEY oF FAMiuEs AND HOUSEHOLDS WOPucNG PAPER No.1
(1988), available at http://ww.ssc.visc.edu/cde/nsflvp/nsfhl.pdf (last modified
Dec. 15, 1995).
162 Nock & Brinig, supra note 56 (manuscript at 26, tbl.2).
163 See id. (manuscript at 27, tbl.4).
164 See id. (manuscript at 7).





hold labor questions (or who answered "zero hours" for more than
three of the questions) also had more stable marriages.Ios
These findings indicate that the early feminist predictions of suc-
cessful egalitarian marriages are over optimistic. The most likely psy-
chological explanations for these results are that "women's jobs" are
distasteful or have lower status or are less goal-directed than the
"men's."169 The economic explanation for all the differences between
men's and women's work would seem to be that "men's work" contrib-
utes directly to marital assets (which have value outside the relation-
ship), while "women's work" does not.170 This explanation suggests
that couples should rely on third parties (or advanced technology) for
"women's work" and promote or subsidize (to the extent they are not
favored anyway) "men's work," especially if the couple works on cars
or household repairs together. It also suggests that couples who are
not keeping track of who is doing what around the house are hap-
pier.17 1 This, of course, relates to the theme of unconditional love
that differentiates marriages from other close interpersonal
relationships.
An alternative explanation, that increased labor force participa-
tion by women itself destabilizes marriage, is not borne out by empiri-
cal research. 172 Although women may work more in the labor force
168 See id.; see also Nock, supra note 30, at 239-41 (stating that certain behavior in
marriage only makes sense if its turn-taking nature is considered and that marriages
exist not only in the present, but more vividly in their "histories and futures"); Smith
et al., supra note 46, at 321 (reporting that wives do not view their disproportionate
share of housework to be unfair when they believe it "helps create a happy and har-
monic life").
169 See supra note 119.
170 See Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L Nock, "I Only Want Trust": A'onns, Trust and
Autonomy (unpublished manuscript, at 15, on file with author).
171 See id. (manuscript at 15-17). For a more general application of the
Heisenberg principle of quantum mechanics to economics, see Eric Blankmeyer, The
Heisenberg Principle in Economics, available at http://netec.mcc.ac.uk[WoPEc/data/Pa-
pers/wpawuwpgt9904004.html (Apr. 20, 1999).
172 See genera/!y Liana C. Sayer & Suzanne M. Bianchi, Women's Economic Indepen-
dence and the Probability of Divorce" A Review and Reexamination, 21 J. Fht. ISSuES 906
(2000) (concluding that women's greater economic independence does not
destabilize marriage). Sayer and Bianchi are trying to disprove the common supposi-
tion that women's increased employment (and economic power) destabilizes mar-
riage. They found, using the National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH),
that "indicators of marital commitment and satisfaction are better predictors of mari-
tal dissolution than are measures of economic independence." Id. at 938. Interest-
ingly, Sayer and Bianchi's piece, supra, found that if the husband felt the marriage was
troubled or unhappy, it was not a statistically significant predictor of divorce vithin
the next five years. See iaL at 932-33. If the wife felt the marriage was troubled or
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after the marriage becomes unstable (at least in part to guard against
the chance of having to work at a less satisfactoryjob after divorce),173
labor force participation or their earning power was not significantly
associated with divorce, while women's emotional satisfaction with the
relationship was. 174
CONCLUSIONS
So, was the influence of Marvin on marriage good or bad? The
undisputed good, from a feminist point of view at least, is that Marvin
recognizes the value that women confer on men and family. At the
same time Marvin was being argued and written, a number of legisla-
tures were enacting property distribution statutes. 175 Many of these
"first generation" statutes explicitly recognized spouses' contributions
to the family as well as their financial contributions. 176 As will be
shown shortly, the question is whether the way that revelation has
played out (only at dissolution, instead of more pervasively) poses a
problem for marriage.177 If compensation is made pervasively and
does not require periodic cost-accounting, it should not destabilize
unhappy, there was a statistically significant relationship, holding other things con-
stant, at least to p < .01 and in one model to p < .001. Id. at 929-31 & tbl.3.
173 See StacyJ. Rogers & Paul R. Amato, Have Changes in Gender Relations Affected
Marital Quality?, 79 Soc. FORCES 731, 732 (2000); see also Parkman, supra note 22, at
44 (arguing that married women may work outside of the home in order to protect
themselves against the economic consequences of no-fault divorce).
174 See Sayer & Bianchi, supra note 172, at 918-19, 932-33.
175 See, ag, Martha L. Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideolog, Contradiction and
Social Change, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 789, 809-11; O'Connell, supra note 22, at 1494-98;
Marcia O'Kelly, Entitlements to Spousal Support AfterDivorce, 61 N.D. L. REv. 225, 225-26
(1985).
176 By the winter of 1983, thirty-two states considered nonmonetary contributions
(such as being a homemaker, serving as a parent, contributing to career potential of
the other spouse, or contributing to the well-being of the family) in determining
property distribution and/or maintenance. Doris Jonas Freed & Henry H. Foster,
Family Law in the Fifly States: An Overview, 17 FAM. L.Q. 365, 381 & tbl.V (1984).
177 One suggested solution to this problem is to restrict divorce so that the ine-
qualities never surface. Thus some writers have suggested changes in divorce grounds
to allow "no fault" divorces only when there is mutual consent. See, e.g., ALLEN M.
PARmiAN, No-FAULT DIVORCE: WHAT WENT WRONG? 137-40 (1992); Allen M. Park-
man, Bringing Consistency to the Financial Arrangements at Divorce, 87 Ky. LJ. 51, 61 &
n.43 (1999); Allen M. Parkman, Reform of the Divorce Provisions of the Marriage Contract,
8 BYUJ. PuB. L. 91, 106 (1993). Scott and Scott, supra note 45, argue that divorce, as
the termination of relational contract, requires a reasonable opportunity for "winding
down" the marriage partnership so that each spouse can disentangle or realize invest-
ment. See Scott & Scott, supra note 45, at 1263-84. The Scotts' provision basically
gives notice that a divorce will occur after, say, two years. Id. at 1262. But this does
not help the spouse who has been emotionally abused nor the spouse who is emotion-
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marriage. That is the benefit of the fifty-fifty sharing assumptions' 78
that have been in place in intact community property regimes for
some years. 179 The important insight is that home work needs to be
dignified and the property/support thus gained treated as earned, not
as a gift or handout. 80 In dissolution cases, household work needs to
be treated as contributing not only to financial assets, but also to fu-
ture earnings generally. 81 The investment made in the other's future
earning capacity is not necessarily tied to the contributing spouse's
earning potential. That is, to some extent, though the career sacrifice
of the homemaker may be quite different, the employed spouse will
gain the same whether the homemaker has given up a legal or a secre-
tarial or a nurse's aide career.1832 This point is missed by the ALI Prin-
cipes, which allow permanent compensation to reduce loss and
equalize income, but not rise to the level of the gain to the other
spouse. 83  . I
But to keep from destabilizing marriage and reducing marital be-
havior to a series of exchanges, 8 4 the contributions of what Nock dis-
cusses in terms of marital-specific capita's8 must be realized during
ongoing marriages as well. This concern might argue for something
ally reaping no satisfaction from the relationship who also has made career
investments.
178 For a discussion noting that many feminists favored equal division of property
during divorce reform efforts of the 1970s and 1980s, see Bartlett, supra note 123, at
479-80. See also Fimeman, supra note 175, at 836 (noting that the Wisconsin Marriage
and Divorce Act has a rebuttable presumption of equal division instead of needs-
based settlement); Isabel Marcus, Lodked In and Lodcd Out: RceJccions on the Histoly of
Divorce Law Reform in New York State, 37 BUFF. L REX'. 375, 450 (1988-S9) (noting that
many feminists find the "rebuttable presumption of equal distribution" more attrac-
tive than "equitable distribution").
179 See Susan Westerberg Prager, Sharing Pinciples and the Future of Marital Proprty
Law, 25 UCLA L. REV. 1, 1 (1977); MichaelJ. Vaughn, The Polity of Community Pmply
and Inter-spousal Transactions, 19 BAYLOR L. REV. 20, 20-21 (1967).
180 See; eg, Marcus, supra note 178, at 438-39 & n.255 (stating that otherwise the
system is fundamentally unfair).
181 See Brinig, supra note 64, at 423.
182 SeeJune Carbone, Economics, Feminism, and the Reinvention ofAlimony: A rply to
Ira Ellman, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1463, 1487 & n.100 (1990).
183 ALI PPmcnLms (Proposed Final Draft 1997), supra note 27, § 5.05.
184 This is what I see as the primary problem of a number of contract-based solu-
tions. See generally Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Pemar-
ital Agreements and How It Think About Marriage, 40 Wzf. & M.xnv L REv. 145 (1998)
(arguing that a contractual, market-based model of marriage is not entirely appropri-
ate); Wax, supra note 22 (describing how strictly market based notions fall to capture
the full reality of "marital bargaining").
185 See Nock, supra note 30, at 238-39.
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like the taxation solution proposed by Nancy Staudt. 186 Such a "car-
rot" or reward approach, 8 7 as opposed to arguing for equal division
of assets upon divorce, might also include the moribund "comparable
worth" compensation 88 for traditionally female occupations that re-
quire as much training or education as traditionally male "corn-
parables." It might suggest direct compensation from the employer
who, as in the case of the university president, requires significant ser-
vice by the key employee's spouse. 8 9 For recipients of government
benefits, it suggests treating all caretakers as being as dependent upon
external wage supports as are their charges. 90 Another positive step
may be marriage education, which focuses on communication skills
learned prior to marriage and reinforced throughout it.191 Of course,
though this tactic seems to help reduce divorce, it may not promote
186 Staudt, supra note 22, at 1647 (proposing taxing women's contributions to
GNP like any other work so that these contributions will be valued and also "earn"
such benefits as Social Security). For a more recent approach on getting rlid of mar-
riage tax, see Amy L. Wax, Caring Enough: Sex Roles, Work and Taxing Women, 44 ViLt,
L. REV. 495, 518-23 (1999) (suggesting that removal of the more burdensome tax on
the second, more elastic, earner will reduce women's immiseration; finding the
source of the role inequality not in housework but in childcare). See generally ED.
vARD J. McGAmRY, TAXING WOMEN (1997), for a discussion of these principles.
187 See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REv.
2401, 2450-51 (1995) (advocating giving parents privileges to compensate them as
fiduciaries unless they are shown to be unfit).
188 See Sandra J. Libeson, Comment, Reviving the Comparable Worth Debate in the
United States: A Look Toward the European Community, 16 CoMip. LAB. LJ. 358, 394-96
(1995).
189 See, eg., UGa President's Wife to Receive Stipend, FLA. TIMES-UNIoN, Oct. 19, 2000,
at B5 (reporting that the president's wife will receive a $30,000 annual compensa-
tion). See generally Julianne Basinger, A Paycheck for Presidents' Spouses, CHRON. OF
HIGHER EDuc., Sept. 22, 2000, at A37 (citing survey data and discussing the case of
Mary Ann Shaw, who has a formal title with the provost's office and earns $65,000 at
Syracuse University).
190 See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SExuAL FAMILY
AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 161-64, 231-32 (1995) (advocating that
"inevitable dependants" should be placed along with their caregivers in the legal cate-
gory of the family); see also Martha L.L Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political
Role of Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181, 2200 (1995).
191 See generally Scott M. Stanley et at, Strengthening Marriages and PreventingDivorce:
New Directions in Prevention Research, 44 FAm. REL. 392 (1995) (reporting on the Preven-
tion and Relationship Enhancement Program (PREP) eighteen-year follow-up study).
The program focuses on couples' communication skills and handling of conflict. See
id at 394; see also William Doherty Home Page, at http://www.nco.nortlifield.mn.us,/
doherty/index.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2001) (featuring many publications of Wil-
liam Doherty, Director of the Marriage and Family Therapy Program at the University
of Minnesota and proponent of couple education).
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equality of power during marriage. And, as Katharine Bartlett ob-
served, that continues to be the central problem for family law.1
0 2
192 Bartlett, supra note 123, at 475. Feminists have questioned "die justice of a
legal regime that has permitted, even reinforced, the subordination of some family
members to others." Id.
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TABLE 1. HouRs SPENT ON HOUSEWORK




Not Employed 48.0-43.0 23.0-34.0 37.1 33




Not Employed 5.0-8.0 3.0-9.0 5.0 6.4
Employed 5.5-8.0 3.0-9.5 6.4 7.8
Table derived from Francine D. Blau, Trends in the Well-Being of American Women, 1970.
1995, Nat'l Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 6206, tbl.12 (1997);
data are drawn from the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 1979 and 1989.
HOUSEWORK DURING MARRIAGE
TABLE 2. AVERAGE HouRs SPENT ON HOUSEHOLD TASKS
BY HUSBANDS AND WiVES
Household Task Husbands Wives N Sig.T.
1. Preparing Meals 2.05 9.75 4377 0.001"
2. Washing Dishes 1.76 6.07 4377 0.001*
3. Cleaning House 1.59 8.13 4379 0.001*
4. Outdoor Tasks 4.96 1.81 4380 0.001*
5. Shopping 1.39 2.81 4380 0.001*
6. Washing, Ironing 0.57 4.29 4379 0.001*
7. Paying Bills 1.36 1.60 4378 0.001*
8. Auto Maintenance 1.84 0.18 4379 0.001*
9. Driving Others 1.15 1.39 4372 0.001
Male Tasks (4+8) 6.80 1.99 4375 0.001*
Female Tasks
(1+2+3+5+6+7+9) 9.87 33.98 4381 0.0010
* Paired samples T-Test (2-tailed) is significant at p < 0.001
Table from Nock & Brinig, supra note 56 (manuscript at 26, tbl.2).
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TALE 3. SuMvR STATISTICS FOR ALL VARIABLEs
(N=2892)
Average/ Standard
Sample Characteristic Percentage Deviation
Years in Current Marriage 18.99 15.74
Percent who Separated/Divorced 10.58%
Husband's Age at Marriage 24.47 5.41
Wife's Age at Marriage 22.6 4.87
Percent of Couples who Cohabited Before Marrying 18.34%
Number of Children Born to Couple 2.12 1.79
Husband's Wage/Salary Wave I (thousands) 20.76 26.81





Husband American Indian 0.36%
Spouses Different Races 13.61%
Husband's Years of Schooling 12.84 3.43
Wife's Years of Schooling 12.74 2.91
Husband's Parents Divorced 9.26%
Wife's Parents Divorced 9.15%
Husband's Hours at Paid Work Last Week 34.30 21.82
Wife's Hours at Paid Work Last Week 18.52 19.80
Husband's Hours on "Men's" Tasks Last Week 6.80 8.75
Husband's Hours on "Women's" Tasks Last Week 9.87 13.71
Wife's Hours on "Men's" Tasks Last Week 1.99 4.17
Wife's Hours on "Women's" Tasks Last Week 33.98 23.73
Husband's Fairness: Household 3.21 0.56
Wife's Fairness: Household 2.71 0.64
Husband's Fairness: Paid Work 3.01 0.48
Wife's Fairness: Paid Work 2.99 0.50
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TABLE 4. Cox REGRESSIONS PREDICTING MIARrrAL DISRUPTION
1. Control Variables
Model I Model 2 Modd 3 Model 4
Variable B RISK B RISK B RISK B RISK
Cohabited 1.7717 5.8808** 1.6776 5.3528** 1.6677 5.29980* 1.6651 5.2863**
Number of
Children -. 6076 .5447** -. 6187 5387** -. 6291 .5331** -. 6475 .52340*
Husband's
Wages -. 0019 .9981 -. 0047 .9953 -. 0046 .9954 -. 0050 .9931
Wife's Wages -. 0101 .9899 -. 0130 .9870 -. 0108 .9893 -. 0103 .9898
Husband Black .4167 1.5169* .3728 1.4519* .3759 1.4562" .4213 1.5239*
Husband
Hispanic .3080 1.3607 .2441 1.2765 .2716 1.3120 .3054 1.3572
Husband Asian .3517 1.4215 .2471 1.2804 .2455 1.2783 .2506 1.2848
Husband
American
Indian .5910 1.8058 .4515 1.5707 .3698 1.4475 .3338 1.3962
Different Races .0184 1.0186 .0492 1.0505 .0402 1.0410 .0396 1.0404
Husband's
Education .0017 1.0017 -. 0141 .9860 -. 0164 .9837 -. 0219 .9783
Wife's
Education .0017 1.0017 -. 0083 .9918 -. 0154 .9847 -. 0142 .9859
Husband's Age
at Marriage .0002 1.0002 .0041 1.0041 .0039 1.0039 .0055 1.0055
Wife's Age at
MIianiage -. 0757 .9271** -. 0689 .9334** -. 0700 .9324** -. 0745 .928204
Husband's
Parents
Divorced .6762 1.96650* .6231 1.8648"* .5941 1.8115** .5326 1.70330*
Wife's Parents
Divorced .6771 1.9681*1 .6203 1.8594*0 .6096 1.83960* .6080 1.8363-0
* P < .05, ** p < .01 for coefficient or -2LL change over prior model
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11. Division of Labor
[VOL. 76:5
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Variable B RISK B RISK B RISK B RISK
Husband's
Hours Paid
Work .0154 1.0155** .0154 1.0155** .0090 1.0091
Wife's Hours
Paid Work .0019 1.0020 .0015 1.0015 .0360 1.0367*
Husband's
Hours Male
Tasks -. 0244 .9759** -. 0253 .9750** -. 0926 .9115
Husband's
Hours Female
Tasks .0133 1.0134** .0150 1.0151** .1142 1.1210*
Wife's Hours
Male Tasks -.0417 .9592* -. 0386 .9621* -. 2882 .7496*
Wife's Hours
Female Tasks .0065 1.0065* .0066 1.0066* .0497 1.0509"*
* P < .05, ** p < .01 for coefficient or -2LL change over prior model
11. Sense of Fairness
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Variable . B RISK B RISK B RISK B RISK
Husband
Household -. 1558 .8557 .1775 1.1942
Wife
Household -. 2478 .7805** -. 4391 .6146"
Husband Paid
Work -. 3753 .6871** -. 6066 .5452*
Wife Paid Work 1-.0176 .9825 .7369 2.0895"*
* P < .05, ** p < .01 for coefficient or -2LL change over prior model
HOUSEWORK DURING MARRIAGE
IV. Fairness Hours Interaction
Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4












Hours Paid -. 0034 .9946
Wife Fairness:
Pala X Hours
Mfale Tasks .088' 1.0925"
Wife Fairness:
Paid X Hours
Female Tasks -. 0141 .986004
Wife Fairness:
Household X
















Tasks -. 0002 .9997
Husband Fair:.
Paid X Hours
Paid Work .0083 1.0034
Wife Fair. Paid
X Hours Paid
Work -. 0199 .9803 *
N 2858
-2LL 778.310
Change (-2LL) 443.766** 4 4.070** 20.076** 2,4.066*0
* P < .05, ** p < .01 for coefficient or -2LL change over prior model
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